一、报告题目：

Analyst Information Production, Internal Capital Allocation, and Conglomerate Valuation

二、报告人：

郭瑞珍，伊利诺伊大学（芝加哥分校）金融系教授

三、报告时间：

2018年06月11日 （周一）上午9:00-11:00

四、报告地点：

知新楼B423

五、报告人简介：

Re-Jin Guo is Professor of Finance at College of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Chicago. Her research interests include analyses of the market of initial public offerings, cost of capital estimates, corporate governance, large shareholder ownership, as well as valuation of firm’s innovation capability. Her research has been published at Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, and Journal of American Statistical Association; and has been presented at various professional meetings, the Security Exchange Commission, as well as the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Re-Jin currently serves as an associate editor at Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies and at the editorial review board of the Corporate Governance: An International Review. She was an associate editor at Journal of Business, Economics, and Statistics (2012-2016), a Visiting Financial Economist at the Research Center of Shanghai Stock Exchange in the summer of 2006; and a Visiting Professor at the Department of Finance of Fudan University in 2014-2017.

六、 报告摘要：

Analysts are specialists in forecasting industry and market sector trends. Yet there is little evidence on their role as information producers in shaping major corporate strategies. Focusing on conglomerate firms in which CEOs are less informed about segment investment opportunities, this study examines whether analysts’ information production improves conglomerates internal capital market (ICM) efficiency and corresponding market valuation. Using brokerage mergers as exogenous shocks in the analyst industry, we provide causal evidence that a significant decline in ICM efficiency resulted from the reduction of analyst coverage. The effect is more pronounced when conglomerate CEOs face higher internal information  barriers, have less firm-specific knowledge, and when lost analysts are industry specialists. Additional analysis shows that the effect of analyst coverage reduction on ICM efficiency is not driven by weakened external monitoring or increased cost of capital and is robust to a wide array of identification strategies. We further demonstrate a post-event decrease in conglomerate valuation, primarily driven by firms with relatively larger decline in ICM efficiency. Overall, our study provides novel evidence that analysts help conglomerate CEOs gain segment (industry-related) information, which cannot be otherwise obtained  internally due to agency conflicts.

七、主办单位：

yl7703永利官网